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IMPORTING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF 
LIMITED PROFIT HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS INTO 
THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING SYSTEM OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
Evan Bonnstetter1
Housing is a basic human necessity. The current approach to 
affordable housing in the United States is defined in large part by its 
complexity and technical details. Numerous programs, including tax 
credits, grants, and rent vouchers exist to incentivize the development 
and increase the affordability of housing. However, these programs fall 
short in several respects—in particular, access to affordable housing is 
limited and inconsistent among jurisdictions. Affordable housing policy 
must be simplified. A more coherent and comprehensive definition of 
affordable housing is necessary to ensure broad access to this necessity 
of life. The land use planning community has recognized the importance 
of building sustainable communities, but the web of affordable housing 
programs is inadequate to efficiently promote this objective. Affordable 
housing regimes in Austria and the Netherlands, which rely on housing 
associations, provide a novel framework for reforming affordable 
housing policy in the United States.  
1. J.D. Candidate, May 2018. Thank you to Professor Charles Ten Brink for
your invaluable feedback throughout this process. 
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INTRODUCTIONI.
Providing affordable housing is a daunting task. In the United States, 
securing financing for the development of low-income housing is a 
labyrinthian endeavor on its own and one in which many developers rely 
on teams of sophisticated professionals to accomplish. There are 
numerous programs at the state and federal levels of government that 
promote affordable housing, and each presents its own set of 
requirements.2 As a result, technical issues, such as the minutiae of 
financing mechanisms, subsume much of the policy debate surrounding 
the future of affordable housing.3 This article does not focus on these 
narrow technical issues. Opting for a broad approach, this article asks 
whether this tangled web of programs is the best way to promote 
affordable housing in the United States. Before addressing this question, 
several urgent problems must be remarked upon. These problems are 
particularly concerning for the individuals and families who rely on these 
public and private actors to provide their housing.  
Gentrification is often criticized for its effect on low income city 
residents. When deteriorating neighborhoods experience resurgence and 
redevelopment, more affluent residents move into those areas and the 
poorer residents are effectively priced-out of their homes and displaced.4
However, at least one commentator has recognized that “displacement is 
not a necessary result of gentrification . . . [m]ore accurately, it is an 
externality of gentrification—a side effect.”5 Indeed, another 
commentator has recognized that gentrification is actually good for the 
2. See discussion infra Sections III.C.i, III.Cii, III.C.iii.
3. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & G. THOMAS KINGSLEY,
URBAN INST., FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR ADDRESSING LOW-INCOME
HOUSING NEEDS: A POLICY PRIMER 1 (Dec. 2008), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32191/411798-
Federal-Programs-for-Addressing-Low-Income-Housing-
Needs.PDF.
4. For a comprehensive discussion of gentrification see YVONNE FRANZ,
GENTRIFICATION IN NEIGHBOURHOOD DEVELOPMENT 67–100 (2015). 
5. Jennifer Cohoon McStotts, Dwelling Together: Using Cooperative Housing
to Abate the Affordable Housing Shortage in Canada and the United States, 32 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 136 (2004). 
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city, as well as poor and ethnic minorities.6 This argument suggests that 
the more affluent residents are within the city, the better the city is able 
to finance affordable housing.7 Nevertheless, city governments have 
largely failed to meet this challenge and have neglected to utilize the 
resources gained by redevelopment to provide affordable housing.8 For 
example, the large complex-style housing projects of the previous 
century have been criticized for creating areas of concentrated poverty 
and are often evocative of images of crime and violence.9 While these 
towering housing projects were viewed as misguided as early as thirty 
years ago, many of these projects have only been demolished and 
replaced this century, inviting a host of new problems.10 Current 
approaches also present their own shortcomings and difficulties.11 While 
6. J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 406 (2003).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Evie Blad, 50 Years Later, Housing Programs’ Reach is Limited, EDUCATION
WEEK (Mar. 25, 2014), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/03/26/26wophousing_ep.h33.html; see also
Sandra Johnson, The Real Story of Living in Cabrini-Green Projects, AUSTIN WEEKLY
NEWS (Apr. 8, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.austinweeklynews.com/News/Articles/4-8-
2014/The-real-story-of-living-in-Cabrini_Green-projects/. A Minnesota report identified 
that crime rates tended to increase as the size of the housing complex increased. SPENCER
AGNEW, MINN. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, THE IMPACT OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON
COMMUNITIES AND HOUSEHOLDS 3–4,
http://www.mhponline.org/files/AffordableHousingImpact-
CommunitiesandHouseholds.pdf. Crime is one of the strongest negative perceptions of 
affordable housing projects. Id. at 10. In Chicago, crime rates decreased as public 
housing high-rises were demolished. DANIELLE H. SANDLER, IS PUBLIC HOUSING A PUBLIC
BAD? EXTERNALITIES OF CHICAGO’S PUBLIC HOUSING DEMOLITIONS 13 (2012), 
http://www.dhsandler.com/uploads/3/0/2/8/3028537/externalities_of_public_housing.pdf. 
10. When a housing project is demolished, many of the previous residents
become temporarily displaced before they are successfully relocated. See e.g., Sudhir 
Venkatesh & Isil Celimli, Tearing Down the Community, NAT’L HOUSING INST. (Nov. 1, 
2004), https://shelterforce.org/2004/11/01/tearing-down-the-community/. 
11. Id. One resident who left Chicago’s Robert Taylor Homes and was relocated
to temporary housing while new mixed-income housing was under construction, found 
herself in a house plagued with rats and an unsympathetic landlord. Id. Interestingly, one 
former resident of Chicago’s Ida B. Wells projects who now lives in a mixed-income 
neighborhood stated that she felt more comfortable in Wells, and that she feels like she 
does not fit in to the mixed-income housing. Zach Mortice, When Public Housing Goes 
Private, CURBED CHICAGO (Sept. 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), 
http://chicago.curbed.com/2016/9/28/13063710/chicago-public-housing-cha. Her sense of 
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supporters argue that the federal voucher system12 enables greater access 
to housing in a greater number, and in areas of less concentrated poverty, 
many critics suggest that those benefits have not been realized.13
Adequately addressing gentrification will require lawmakers and policy 
analysts to develop a clearer sense of both the purpose and scope of 
affordable housing. Another specter haunts the American landscape. 
Urban sprawl threatens to consume the American landscape with a 
never-ending span of suburban developments.14 Among the negative 
effects of urban sprawl is the “abandonment of urban centers, severe air 
and water pollution, and the loss of open green spaces.”15 Furthermore, 
sprawl also poses significant obstacles to transportation, as the distance 
between homes, jobs, and other destinations increases.16 As jobs move 
further away and the cost of commuting increases, the harm of sprawl is 
borne disproportionately by minorities, who tend, as a result of “past 
racism in the real estate industry and in federal housing initiatives,” to 
live “in impoverished, segregated, inner-city communities.”17
Importantly, limiting future sprawl and addressing existing sprawl 
will require statewide coordination, although most land use controls 
operate at a local level.18 In fact, many of the land use planning and 
control tools available to municipalities can be used to outright preclude 
nostalgia is not without basis, as there is some research indicating that “in difficult times 
feeling nostalgic can promote personal growth rather than a counterproductive 
preoccupation with the past.” Krystine Irene Batcho, Nostalgia: Retreat or Support in 
Difficult Times?, 126 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 355, 356 (2013) (discussing “whether nostalgia is 
associated with adaptive or maladaptive coping”). Nevertheless, this note takes the 
position that mixed-income housing is a better long-term solution, and must defer to 
experts in psychology in making the important determinations as to why former-projects 
residents feel attached to those projects, why they feel uncomfortable in mixed-income 
residences, and what can be done to address this unease. 
12. See discussion infra Section III.C.ii.
13. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING 122–26 (Andrew T. Carswell ed., 2d ed.
2012). 
14. Id.at 613.
15. Michael M. Maya, Transportation Planning and the Prevention of Urban
Sprawl, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 879, 879–80 (2008). 
16. Id. at 880.
17. Id. at 884.
18. Id. at 880. Increasing recognition that statewide coordination is relevant is
evidenced by states implementing state regional zoning programs. JULIAN CONRAD
JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION LAW § 9:5 (3d ed. 2012).
108 Michigan State ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ5HYLHZ [Vol. 26.1
affordable housing developments in the municipality.19 Because of these 
various competing interests, some degree of coordination between states 
at the federal level may also be necessary.20 Yet again, preventing the 
negative externalities of gentrification could present an answer in the 
form of smart growth, by encouraging higher-density housing 
development near urban centers.21 This mixed-use approach reduces 
obstacles to transportation by placing homes near jobs and creating new 
opportunities in municipal services employment.22 While air and water 
pollution issues are also aggravated by sprawl, those are largely outside 
the scope of this note. However, increased density could also remedy the 
loss of green space within the city;23 specifically, by building up, rather 
than out, cities might also preserve more land within the city for use as 
parks. A higher population density within the city could also retain more 
open land outside the city for state forest or wetland preserves, for 
example.24 The primary issue, then, is ensuring that resources are being 
utilized to promote these positive effects of gentrification, by 
19. McStotts, supra note 5, at 140.
20. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act demonstrates one such form of
widely utilized federal guidance for states. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 
§ 2:9; see also A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (ADVISORY COMM. ON
ZONING, DEP’T OF COMMERCE 1926). 
21. Byrne, supra note 6, at 406 n.3. Smart growth is “an emerging concept
designed to address planning capacity and quality, urban form, and infrastructure with a 
supportive decision-making process.” S. Mark White & Elisa L. Paster, Creating 
Effective Land Use Regulations Through Concurrency, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 753, 755 
(2003). Some of the primary objectives of smart growth include:  
[P]lanning capacity that anticipates and provides for development 
and growth, compact urban forms, protection of natural 
resources, infill development, mixed use, walkable 
neighborhoods, variety and choice in housing, balanced multi-
modal transportation systems, maximization of existing 
infrastructure, timely and fairly funded new infrastructure, and 
improved development processes with reasonable and predicable 
results. 
Id. at 755–56.
22. Byrne, supra note 6, at 419–20.
23. See generally Maya, supra note 15, at 880, 884.
24. See id.
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implementing regulations that will align interests regionally—within the 
municipality, across the state, and among states.25
While commentators have devoted considerable efforts to scrutinizing 
affordable housing, gentrification, and sprawl, American housing policy 
has remained relatively static.26 This article argues that a regulatory 
scheme that facilitates cooperation across socio-economic backgrounds 
and creates shared interests in a safe community, a strong economy, and 
a vibrant social scene could combat the social stigmas and economic 
interests that facilitate gentrification while harnessing its positive 
potential in redeveloping cities.  
In the United States, cities, states, and the federal government have 
taken various approaches towards the difficult task of providing 
affordable housing.27 However, historically, those approaches have, in 
certain applications, actually contributed to the displacement of the urban 
poor and minorities and caused other deleterious effects.28 The American 
Constitutional framework has hindered development of affordable 
housing by permitting exclusionary zoning practices.29 Furthermore, the 
25. “Local governments are often not well-equipped to deal with these trans-
jurisdictional issues because their abilities and agendas are limited; therefore, a regional 
perspective is needed for effective planning.” JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 
18, § 9:5. “Regions have been defined as ‘geographic areas with problems of public 
policy or administration for which no existing unit of government is organized.’” Id.
“The necessity for a regional approach has been exacerbated and complicated by the 
development of megapolitan clusters or transmetropolitan areas which extend beyond 
traditional metropolitan areas and often cover several metropolitan areas and states.” Id.
26. See discussion infra Sections III.C.i, III.C.ii.
27. See STUART MECK ET AL., REGIONAL APPROACHES TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING
3–4 (2003) (discussing fair-share programs, an incentive program, regional housing trust 
funds, state affordable housing appeals systems, as well as private-sector and other 
initiatives). 
28. In the 1980s and 1990s, Chicago high-rise public housing units were in
serious disrepair and housed “the most troubled families with nowhere else to go.”
SANDLER, supra note 9, at 5. Furthermore, when the city began tearing these units down, 
violent crime rates decreased. Id. at 17. 
29. Serena M. Williams, The Need for Affordable Housing: The Constitutional
Viability of Inclusionary Zoning, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 77–79 (1992). Conversely, 
some states, perhaps most notably New Jersey, have recognized affordable housing 
mandates within state constitutions. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel 
(Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 713, 724–25 (N.J. 1983); see also S. Burlington Cty. 
NAACP. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713, (1975). 
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“not in my backyard”30 attitude is perhaps the most significant obstacle to 
affirmative action that could promote the development of affordable 
housing.31 As a consequence, less intensive means such as subsidies and 
tax credits are most commonly relied on to incentivize such 
development—a trend that one commentator has called an 
“entrepreneurial” approach.32 The public housing system of the United 
States has been criticized by commentators both inside and outside the 
country.33 Indeed, while “the United States remains the wealthiest large 
industrialized nation, it devotes less of its income to welfare and the state 
is less involved in the economy than is true for other developed 
countries.”34
In Western Europe, many countries have taken a more active 
approach to provide social housing.35 The diverse governmental, 
statutory, and constitutional frameworks within Europe have produced 
various solutions to a common problem.36 Section II of this article 
identifies two European countries that have taken active, yet distinct 
stances in providing social housing—Austria and the Netherlands. By 
examining the legal frameworks within these two countries and the 
United States, as well as the specific laws enacted to provide social 
30. A derogative term used to refer to people who oppose development. See
generally Alana Semuels, From ‘Not in My Backyard’ to ‘Yes in My Backyard’, THE 
ATLANTIC (July 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/yimby-
groups-pro-development/532437/. 
31. Williams, supra note 29, at 104.
32. Charles L. Edson, Affordable Housing—An Intimate History, 20 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 193, 197 (2011). 
33. For a commentary comparing housing policy against its neighbor to the north,
see Cyrus Vakili-Zad, Public Housing: A Summary of Major Difference Between the 
United States and Canada, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 111 
(2002). There is a shortage of affordable housing in the United States. Kriston Capps, 
Every Single County in America is Facing an Affordable Housing Crisis, CITYLAB (June 
18, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/06/every-single-county-in-america-is-
facing-an-affordable-housing-crisis/396284/; see also Kyle Jaeger, The U.S. Has an 
Affordable Housing Problem, ATTN: (Apr. 5, 2016), 
http://www.attn.com/stories/7095/new-report-reveals-affordable-housing-crisis-united-
states. 
34. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD 33 (1996). 
35. See MICHELA BRAGA, ET AL., EUR. PARLIAMENT, SOCIAL HOUSING IN THE EU
6, 8 (2013), http://www.iut.nu/Literature/EU/EU_and_SocialHousing_Jan_2013.pdf. 
36. See id. at 10–13.
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housing, and with reference to the unique social and historical contexts 
of these countries, Section III seeks to identify what motivates and 
enables successful social housing policy. Ultimately, Section IV presents 
a proposal for reform in the United States, by singling out which aspects 
of the Dutch and Austrian systems could be imported into the United 
States’ legal framework for providing affordable housing. 
The regulatory systems of private housing associations in Austria and 
the Netherlands provide a unique approach to addressing the competing 
interests and values underlying gentrification by allying lower-income 
residents with the new, wealthier residents that might otherwise displace 
them. Private housing associations necessarily require the participation 
and cooperation of both lower-income residents and the higher-earning 
professionals who manage the associations. The Austrian and Dutch 
experiences can provide a framework for new federal and state law 
importing private housing associations into the United States. 
WHY THE NETHERLANDS AND AUSTRIA WERE SELECTED FOR THIS II. 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 
This analysis begins with the foundational premise that any developed 
country must implement some degree of regulation to stimulate the 
creation of affordable, or social, housing.37 This simple concept could be 
defined broadly as the spectrum of regulation.  
  
 37. “The definition of affordability varies among federal, state and local 
governments,” but is variously defined with reference to housing costs as a percentage of 
household income. MECK ET AL., supra note 27, at 22. The American Planning 
Association defines affordable housing as “housing that has a sales price or rental amount 
that is within the means of a household that may occupy middle-, moderate-, low-, or 
very low-income housing.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Likewise, there is “no common 
definition of social housing … available at the EU level, with different States adopting 
different definitions that translate into varying levels of public intervention within the 
sector.” BRAGA ET AL., supra note 35, at 6. There are, however, “three elements common 
across European social housing sectors: a mission of general interest, the objective of 
increasing the supply of affordable housing, and the identification of specific targets 
defined in terms of socioeconomic status or the presence of vulnerabilities.” Id. For the 
sake of uniformity, and consistent with the above discussion, this note will use 
“affordable housing” to refer to American approaches, as well as the notion of providing 
housing that is affordable, irrespective of geographic location; furthermore, this note will 
use “social housing” to refer broadly to European approaches to provide affordable 
housing. 
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Similarly, if this analysis is to produce any meaningful results, it must 
first be recognized that some legal systems or social backgrounds might 
simply be too different, such that aspects of those systems simply could 
not be meaningfully compared, let alone imported in the United States. 
Additionally, this article will not examine those countries that impose 
less regulation because the purpose of this analysis is to determine 
whether a new variety, and greater degree, of federal regulation might 
not only be possible, but also beneficial, in the United States. 
There are numerous factors and considerations underpinning any 
regulatory scheme, including the scope and purpose of the housing and 
administration. For example, the housing might be lowest income, low 
and medium income, or universal housing. Administration of the housing 
may be overseen by public or private actors, or a combination thereof.38
Implementation might be accomplished by incentivization or mandate, 
depending on the legal framework.39 This article argues that each of these 
regulatory considerations is influenced by a country’s history, culture, 
social structure, and legal framework; accordingly, each of these aspects 
will be treated within the broader analysis.  
For example, a country’s geography, population, and availability of 
land should influence the policy considerations underlying any system 
for providing affordable housing.40 The United States is a much larger 
country than either Austria or the Netherlands. Historically, in the United 
States, social commentators have referred to as “prairie psychology”—
the notion that in a country as large as the United States, there will 
always be space for development elsewhere, particularly on the fringes 
and outside of the city.41 Yet, cities and suburbs can only sprawl so far. 
Western European countries and cities are more physically constrained 
38. BRAGA ET AL., supra note 35, at 10.
39. Inclusionary zoning is a form of mandated affordable housing.
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 1, § 6:7. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
is a form of affordable housing incentivization. See discussion infra Section III.C.i. 
40. See generally John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, The Effects of Land
Use Regulation on the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn?, 8 
CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 69, 72–75 (2005) (discussing categories of land use 
regulations and the policies behind them). Arguably, many of the same considerations at 
a local and regional level should also apply broadly at the national level. 
41. David C. Soule, The Cost of Sprawl in URBAN SPRAWL: A COMPREHENSIVE
REFERENCE GUIDE 264 (David C. Soule, ed., 2006). 
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by their geography;42 thus, these space issues are more immediately 
relevant in Austria and the Netherlands, and their approaches to urban 
land management could be instructive in the United States, which must 
address these issues as open land becomes more scarce.  
Another significant factor that heavily influences housing policy 
considerations is the degree of recognition property rights, particularly 
whether a country affords protection to housing as a fundamental right.43
The Constitution of the United States does not recognize housing as a 
fundamental right.44 Although states and localities may recognize greater 
protection of housing, it is far from the degree afforded by some 
European countries.45 Certain housing rights have been identified as 
protected within the European Convention on Human Rights.46
42. See Vienna, for example, has expanded to its geological boundaries. James A.
Kushner, Growth for the Twenty-First Century: Tales from Bavaria and the Vienna 
Woods – Comparative Images of Urban Planning in Munich, Salzburg, Vienna, and the 
United States, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 89, 90 (1997). 
43. See Emily Ponder, Gentrification and the Right to Housing: How Hip
Becomes a Human Rights Violation, 22 Sw. J. Int’l L. 359, 382–83 (2016) (calling for 
“large-scale policy reform” to address gentrification, guided by the right to housing, 
which is an “international standard”).
44. Id. at 382.
45. For example, “in 1975, the state supreme courts of New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and New York imposed regional responsibilities on local governments to open their land 
for the provision of affordable housing.” JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 
6:6. Several other states also “require that municipalities address housing needs in their 
comprehensive planning legislation,” including California, Florida, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Id. § 6:1. Several other states also “require that 
municipalities address housing needs in their comprehensive planning legislation,”
including California, Florida, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Id. at 215. 
Conversely, there are numerous UN documents that recognize a right to housing. Mayra 
Gomez & Bret Thiele, Housing Rights are Human Rights, 32 HUM. RTS. (2005) (“The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), for example, explicitly recognizes the 
right to adequate housing, as does the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966). Housing rights are also enshrined and protected within the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1965), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (1979), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1959), and the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(1990).”).
46. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUR. CONV. ON
H.R., Protocol, Art. 1. For a discussion of the issues surrounding housing as a human 
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Moreover, the European Social Charter expressly states that “[e]veryone 
has the right to housing.”47
Broadly, European countries employ two systems of allocation 
criteria in determining the scope of availability of social housing.48 Under 
the universalistic approach, “housing is a primary public responsibility 
and the object of social housing is to provide the whole population with 
decent quality housing at an affordable price.”49 Under the targeted 
approach, “[s]ocial housing is only directed at those individuals and 
households whose demand for housing with decent quality at an 
affordable price is not satisfied by the market.”50 There are two “sub-
models” within the targeted approach—the generalist and residual 
models.51 The targeted-generalist approach allocates housing “to 
households with an income below a pre-identified ceiling,” while the 
targeted-residual model allocates housing to “the most vulnerable 
groups.”52
The Netherlands has the largest stock of social housing in the 
European Union, comprising 32% of all Dutch housing.53 The Dutch 
system is also described as a universalistic approach to social housing.54
“The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy”55 and a parliamentary 
democracy56, and it is comprised of twelve provinces.57 Government in 
right in Europe, including relevant cases, see generally Arturs Kucs et al., The Right to 
Housing: International, European and National Perspectives, 64/65 CUADERNOS
CONSTITUCIONALES DE LA CÁTEDRA FADRIQUE FURIΌ CERIOL 105–10 (2008) and CORMAC
Ó. DÚLACHÁIN, HOUSING RIGHTS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS &
NATIONAL MECHANISMS (2009),
https://www.ihrec.ie/download/pdf/paper20091121_annconf_dulachain.pdf. 
47. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER (REVISED), Part 1, ¶ 31.
48. BRAGA, ET AL., supra note 35, at 12.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Constitutional Monarchy, GOV’T OF THE NETH.,
https://www.government.nl/topics/constitution/constitutional-monarchy (last visited Aug. 
26, 2017). 
56. Parliament, GOV’T OF THE NETH.,
https://www.government.nl/topics/parliament (last visited Aug. 26, 2017). 
57. F.A.M. HOBMA & P. JONG, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT LAW IN THE
NETHERLANDS: AN INTRODUCTION 6 (2016). 
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the Netherlands is both more unitary and centralized than that of 
Austria.58 In comparison, Austria has the second largest stock of social 
housing in the European Union, at 23%.59 Austria’s housing regime is 
targeted-generalist.60 Austria is a regionalized federation of provinces, 
which is more closely related to the United States’ federal republic 
system of governance, insofar as the Austrian housing regime is 
legislated at the federal level, but administered at the provincial and 
municipal levels.61
The various components of the affordable housing regime in the 
United States are representative of a targeted-generalist approach.62
Specifically, the various vouchers create income ceilings, which 
recipients must fall below to qualify for assistance.63 The tax credits and 
grants available to states and developers promote housing for those 
qualifying individuals, which also evidence a targeted-generalist 
approach.64 Because affordable housing in the United States is less 
centralized, it is difficult to quantify the total amount of affordable 
housing units available in the country.65
58. Franz Fallend, Does Federalism Matter?: Comparing Regional Economic
Policies in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, EUR. CONSORTIUM FOR POL.
RES. 4 (May 2007), https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/30c031d9-406f-4ad1-9294-
ee6266fbbc33.pdf. 
59. BRAGA ET AL., supra note 35, at 9.
60. Id. at 13.
61. See HERBERT HAUSMANINGER, THE AUSTRIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 63–69 (1998).
62. See infra Section III.C.
63. See infra Section III.C.ii.
64. See infra Sections III.C.i, III.C.iii.
65. Affordability is generally defined in the United States as 30% of income.
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. U., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: EVOLVING
MARKETS AND NEEDS 6 (2013), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/jchs_americas_rental_housing_2
013_1_0.pdf. The median gross rent in 2011 in the United States was $843, which by the 
30% standard, household income would have to exceed $33,700 to be classified as 
affordable, though that is several thousand dollars above median renter income. Id. at 19. 
At full-time federal minimum wage pay, monthly rent would need to be less than $400. 
Id.
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REGULATORY HOUSING MODELSIII.
This section examines, in turn, the approaches to affordable housing 
taken by Austria, the Netherlands, and the United States. For both 
Austria and the Netherlands, this examination includes a discussion of 
the historical context, the mechanisms and principles, and the social 
context underlying their approach to affordable housing. The 
examination of the United States follows a substantially similar format; 
however, as a consequence of the United States’ multifaceted approach, 
the discussion employs a broader design, as it must address a number of 
different programs. 
The Austrian Limited Profit Housing System A.
In setting the balance between public and private participation, the 
Austrian Limited Profit Housing system has tipped the scales in favor of 
the government. The system is unique in its reliance on government 
bureaucrats to audit and review housing associations. Furthermore, the 
Austrian federal government gives the provinces significant latitude in 
determining how to use federal funds, which developers significantly 
rely upon to construct and maintain housing developments. The 
following sub-sections will examine the history of social housing in 
Austria, the mechanics of Limited Profit Housing, and the Austrian 
social context. 
i. History of Austrian Housing Policy and Law
Austrian social housing arose in the middle of the nineteenth 
century.66 At this time, Austria was experiencing a significant growth in 
population.67 The increase in population led to “distressing” and 
“unbelievably squalid living conditions” in Austria and presented an 
opportunity for social reformers to improve Austria’s housing stock.68
The early social housing endeavors were cooperatively minded and 
focused on constructing housing “for workers by workers.”69 By the late 
66. HERBERT LUDL, GBV, LIMITED-PROFIT HOUSING IN AUSTRIA 2 (2007).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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nineteenth and early twentieth century, the idea of limited-profit housing 
associations that operated as a means of housing assistance within the 
housing market came to fruition.70 At the same time, government 
intervention and regulation of these associations began to be 
introduced.71 Established in 1908, the Public Jubilee Fund “linked the 
approval of housing loans to the distribution of limited profit shares, 
reasonable rents, the tie-up of assets and government auditing”—
concepts that are all familiar in the modern conception of Austrian 
limited-profit housing.72 Limited-profit housing, as it is understood 
today, was first codified in 1938; notably, after Austria was occupied by 
the National Socialists.73 In 1945, Austria adopted the Limited-Profit 
Housing Act, removing any traces of influence by the National 
Socialists.74
The Act “describes limited-profit housing associations as enterprises 
whose activities are directly geared towards the fulfillment of the 
common good in the field of housing and residential matters, whose 
assets are dedicated to the fulfillment of such tasks and whose business 
operations can be regularly reviewed and monitored.”75 The fundamental 
principles of the limited-profit associations has been described as 
“serving the common good, limitation of the scope of activities, 
limitation of the distribution of profit shares and the cost-covering 
principle, as well as the obligatory supervision and checks and 
balances.”76 Accordingly, limited-profit housing attempts to serve the 
public interest by permitting private sector organizations to participate in 
the creation and management of housing.77
Article 11, section 1, subsection 3 of the Federal Constitution states 
that with regards to “social housing affairs except for the promotion of 
domestic dwelling construction and domestic rehabilitation,” the 
legislative power lies with the Federation, and the execution of such laws 
70. Id. at 2–3.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 3–6.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. In Austria, the Act is called Wohnungsgemeinnützigkeitsgesetz. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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lies with the provinces.78 The Limited-Profit Housing Act, thus, is federal 
legislation, while its execution is the domain of the individual 
provinces.79 Wholly within the realm of the provincial jurisdiction are 
those issues “pertaining to the legal relationship between the housing 
association and those entitled to accommodation in matters related to 
housing.”80
ii. Principles and Mechanisms of Limited-Profit Housing
Association Regulation
As discussed previously, the modern Austrian social housing regime 
traces its roots to the Post-World War II era, and it has remained 
relatively static over the years.81 Initially, federal housing legislation was 
focused on reconstruction of “war-damaged urban areas.”82 From the 
very beginning and throughout its existence, Austrian social housing has 
been heavily subsidized.83 In particular, the system is unique in its 
reliance on “direct ‘object’ subsidies” to promote construction of new 
affordable housing developments.84 These are also known as “supply-
side subsidies,” so designated because they “provide assistance to 
producers or suppliers[] . . . such as home builders or landlords.”85 As a 
result of these object subsidies, it is argued, the availability of affordable 
housing reduces demand and accordingly the cost of housing, such that 
only 3–4% of the population receives housing allowances.86 Moreover, 
there is a general reluctance to shift away from these direct object 
subsidies in the future.87
78. Österreichische Bundesverfassung [B-VG]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 11, § 1, cl. 3 (Austria), translated in CONSTITUTE PROJECT,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Austria_2013?lang=en. 
79. LUDL, supra note 66, at 3.
80. Id.
81. See Walter Matznetter, Social Housing Policy in a Conservative Welfare
State: Austria as an Example, 39 URB. STUD. 265, 267 (2002). 
82. Id. at 272.
83. See id. at 272–73.
84. Id. at 273.
85. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING, supra note 13, at 722.
86. LUDL, supra note 66, at 8.
87. Matznetter, supra note 81, at 279.
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The cost-coverage principle is perhaps one of the most important 
features of the limited-profit housing association system. This is the 
requirement that housing associations may only charge a rent amount 
equal to that “necessary to cover the costs for managing the building, 
taking into account a justified amount to cover the costs of managing the 
housing association and to form reserves.”88 Another feature of Austrian 
housing associations is the concept of “tie-up of assets.”89 The objective 
of this is to ensure that the assets of the housing associations are “tied 
up” so that they may “be appropriated for the purpose of housing.”90 The 
tie-up ensures that profits are reinvested in the association, which ensures 
sustainability of the association.91 One way this is enforced is by 
requiring most profits realized by the association to be channeled into its 
reserves.92 Housing associations are permitted to make one distribution 
from profits per year, which “may not exceed the permissible interest 
rate for shareholders’ equity . . . in terms of the shares paid in.”93
Another important aspect is the concept of limited business activities. 
Housing associations are permitted to undertake primary, secondary, and 
“‘connective’ supplementary business activities.”94 Primary business 
activities are those related to “construction and management of 
accommodation, private homes and homes in their own name, as well as 
the large-scale renovation and management of other limited-profit 
housing associations within the framework of their primary business 
activities.”95 Secondary business activities are defined by law and “may 
not become the sole nor the predominant part of the business 
activities.”96 Specific examples include: “construction of housing . . . for 
third parties, . . . construction of commercial premises, . . . urban and 
village renewal, [and] urban sanitation.”97 Connective supplementary 
88. LUDL, supra note 66, at 4.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 4–5.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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business activities require written approval of the provincial 
government.98
All limited-profit housing associations are required to belong to an 
associative organization that conducts regular audits.99 The standard for 
these audits is what is “in the ‘interest of the general public.’”100 The 
audit looks not only to the financial health of the association, but also to 
compliance with applicable law.101 The completed audit is filed with the 
government—the general assembly has access to the whole document, 
and certain excerpts are also made available to the public.102 The 
provincial governments, as supervisory authorities, have the power to 
“order remedial action against any defects [in documents, conduct, or 
accounts] and, if this order is not complied with, they can give official 
notice to eliminate them.”103
iii. Austrian Social Context
Today, one-sixth of those living in Austria occupy an apartment that 
was built or is managed by a limited-profit housing association.104
Limited-profit housing associations manage 21.8% of the Austrian 
housing stock, while 30% of all new construction is undertaken by these 
associations.105 Renters occupy roughly 41% of Austrian housing stock, 
59% of which is social housing.106 Interestingly, only 11% of limited-
profit rental property tenants are considered low-income, while the vast 
majority are middle-income.107 Indeed, from the beginning, Austrian 
housing associations aimed to provide affordable housing to the working 
classes, and these facts indicate that this legacy continues today. Austria 
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 6. 
101. Id. at 5–6.
102. Id. at 6. 
103. Id.
104. LUDL, supra note 66, at 1.
105. Id. at 1, 7.
106. Christoph Reinprecht, Social Housing in Austria, in SOCIAL HOUSING IN
EUROPE 61, 62 (Kathleen Scanlon et al. eds., 2014). 
107. Id. at 70. 
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has developed other means for providing housing for the lowest-earning 
individuals and families.108
Austrian society and policy tends to reflect traditional values.109
Accordingly, housing law and policy is largely pro-family and has been 
resistant to change.110 Housing policy reflects this “familialist” strain, 
and various subsidies and building code provisions exist primarily for the 
benefit of families with children.111 Austrian culture is significantly 
influenced by Catholicism, particularly compared to the “secular 
countries of Protestant Europe.”112 This has contributed to many of the 
identifying features of Austrian culture and politics: “consensual 
democracy, social partnership and a substantial dose of federalism.”113
Austria has a strong corporatist tradition.114 This tradition is evidenced 
in the seventy-year history of the “Social Partnership” (Partnership), a 
term that refers to the “institutionalized relationship between the 
government, political parties and certain interest groups in the field of 
labor, social, and economic policy” within Austria.115 Significantly, the 
Partnership has no express basis in law; rather, its relevance depends 
upon the participation of a combination of voluntary and compulsory 
108. Housing associations “tend to avoid the risks associated with lower income 
and more vulnerable tenancies. Nevertheless, municipal housing companies are more 
orientated to those unable to afford cost rent housing.” JULIE LAWSON & NICO NIEBOER,
OTB RES. INST. FOR HOUS., URBAN & MOBILITY STUD., THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL 
HOUSING OUTCOMES: A MICRO EXAMINATION OF DUTCH AND AUSTRIAN SOCIAL 
LANDLORDS SINCE FINANCING REFORMS 9 (2009), 
http://repository.tudelft.nl/islandora/object/uuid:f950db5e-1cd4-4c5b-97b6-
e453b7fe72d4?collection=research. 
109. Matznetter, supra note 81, at 268. 
110. Id. at 278–79.
111. Some provinces provide bonus subsidies for families with children, or young
married couples who will soon have children. Id. at 278. Additionally, some provinces 
require “children-friendly equipment” to be installed on site. Id.
112. Id. at 272. 
113. Id. at 279. 
114. Reinprecht, supra note 106, at 61. Corporatism is defined by “a high degree 
of centralisation in wage-bargaining, a highly unionised labour force, or a low wage 
dispersion across industries.” Matznetter, supra note 81, at 272. Neo-corporatism 
“widens the view to the involvement of interest associations in general in the formulation 
and implementation of public policy.” Id.
115. Julian Steiner, The Austrian Way: 70 Years of Social Partnership in Austria,
AUSTRIAN INFORMATION THE ZINE (Dec. 16, 2015), 
http://www.austrianinformation.org/winter-2015-16/the-austrian-way. 
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membership organizations.116 In 1987, one commentator noted that 
“Austria’s federal government consistently adopts and implements the 
economic and social policy decisions reached by these groups through 
consensus.”117 However, developments in the latter part of the twenty-
first century have eroded the influence of the Partnership—globalization 
and the integration of Europe evidenced by the consolidation of power in 
the European Union have displaced some of the powers previously 
exercised by the Partnership.118 Nevertheless, the Partnership was 
influential in establishing two primary features of the Limited-
Partnership scheme: “relatively low rent levels and housing that was 
affordable for the vast majority of the population.”119 While the influence 
of the Partnership may be lessening, housing is still viewed as a basic 
necessity that must be protected from an entirely free market.120
Furthermore, while the Partnership itself is not a creature of the law, the 
interaction of private-industry and government in the housing market has 
been institutionalized through the various provisions of the Limited-
Profit Housing laws. 
iv. Concluding Thoughts
For over a century, Austrians have recognized affordable housing as 
an important objective of the state; however, early on, they also realized 
that private-sector involvement would be necessary. Indeed, the Limited-
Profit Housing Act declares that these associations must pursue the 
common good through regular review and monitoring.121 In striking the 
balance between public and private interests, Austria has carved out a 
significant role for the state. The system is highly bureaucratic and 
involves significant regulations at both the provincial and federal level. 
The degree of bureaucracy in the Austrian housing market has incited 
criticism by at least one commentator, who referred to the system as 
116. Id.
117. Robert W. Gilbert, Austria’s Social Partnership: A Unique Extralegal System 
of Labor-Management Cooperation, 3 LAB. LAW. 311, 311 (1987). 
118. Steiner, supra note 115. 
119. Reinprecht, supra note 106, at 61.
120. Id.
121. LUDL, supra note 66, at 3.
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overregulated.122 Perhaps, unsurprisingly, this considerable degree of 
government involvement is accompanied by a continued reliance on 
supply-side subsidization for the development of this housing. Also 
noteworthy is the fact that residences operated by housing associations 
tend not to be heavily occupied by the low or lowest income groups, who 
instead rely on other forms of government housing; rather, the 
associations serve primarily middle-class dwellers. While the 
government plays a large role in the regulation of housing associations, 
this may be predicated upon the strong relationship between government, 
business, and labor evidenced by the Partnership. Specifically, the 
participating parties may be willing to accede to a greater degree of 
government regulation because their interests are being considered 
through the Partnership.  
The Dutch Housing Association System B.
Over the course of the past one-hundred years, and through a process 
of constant and careful deliberation, the Dutch have continuously 
reimagined and refined their concept of affordable housing and housing 
associations. Slowly and steadily, an increasingly larger role has been 
carved out for private interests, such that the Netherlands possesses the 
most commercialized affordable housing market of these three countries. 
The Dutch have also taken a divergent path from Austria and the United 
States, undertaking a novel enterprise to finance their housing 
associations. The following three sections will examine the history of 
social housing in the Netherlands, will examine the mechanisms 
underlying the operation of Dutch housing associations, and will also 
introduce some related concepts within the social context of the 
Netherlands. 
i. Historical Context of Dutch Social Housing
The Dutch housing system traces its roots to the building societies of 
the mid-1800s during which groups of well-to-do middle- and upper-
class individuals set out to provide rental dwellings for the working 
122. FRANZ, supra note 4, at 193.
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class.123 Although these organizations did not construct a large number of 
buildings, they set an important example—the goal was to build 
dwellings for a reasonable return while promoting the social good.124
This movement was supported by both the Liberal Party as well as two 
trade unions.125 The Housing Act of 1901 provided a legal foundation 
and financial support for these early incarnations of housing associations, 
thereby encouraging the creation of new cooperative housing 
associations.126 From 1914 to 1922, the number of housing associations 
increased from less than 300 to 1,350.127 During this period, housing 
associations were small, owning less than sixty units each, on average.128
In 1934, the Act was amended so that housing associations would have 
to repay future financial grants from the State.129
Much like Austria, after the close of World War II, the government’s
focus shifted to rebuilding housing destroyed during the war, and local 
governments took a more active stance in constructing and managing 
housing, in relation to the housing associations.130 This period produced 
large quantities of “austere, large-scale, often monotonous housing.”131
Much of the new construction was commissioned by local authorities and 
then transferred to housing associations once construction was 
complete.132 The general position of the housing associations was weak 
compared to the government.133 Critically, there was a debate over what 
the proper scope for housing associations should be—whether it should 
be limited to serving low-income earners or whether it should also 
123. ANDRÉ OUWEHAND & GELSKE VAN DAALEN, DUTCH HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS:
A MODEL FOR SOCIAL HOUSING 8 (2002).
124. Id.
125. The two trade unions were Algemeen Nederlands Werklieden Verbond and 
Patrimonium, both of which “endeavoured to uplift the working class materially and 
spiritually.” Id.
126. Financial support for associations was conditioned upon the association’s
promotion of social housing and the government’s approval to do so; indeed, the Act 
stated that the association must work “exclusively in the interests of the improvement of 
social housing and as such have been permitted by Us so to do.” Id. at 9.
127. Id. at 10.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 11.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 11.
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provide middle-class dwellings.134 During the 1950s, housing association 
interest groups, private builders, local authorities, and the State worked 
to develop broad policy guidelines that would determine the fate of 
housing associations.135 In 1965, this debate was conclusively resolved—
the Housing Act of 1965 and later amendments both restored and secured 
the position of housing associations with the creation and maintenance of 
affordable housing.136
From the 1970s through the early 1980s, housing associations 
constructed “hundreds of thousands more dwellings” to address a 
housing shortage.137 However, by the early 1980s, the Dutch economy 
was strained, and the State wished to further limit its involvement in the 
affordable housing market.138 State contributions to the associations were 
reduced, and associations were encouraged to reinvest their own funds.139
Perhaps the single most significant development in this history was the 
untethering of the housing associations from government that occurred in 
the 1990s, when State loans to the housing associations were 
cancelled.140 Thereafter, a sea change occurred, as housing associations 
became more self-sufficient, relying instead on their own resources, and 
direct government participation was even further withdrawn.141
Furthermore, since 1990, the proportion of municipal owned housing 
associations has steadily decreased.142 The trend toward 
commercialization has continued, such that in 1995 one commentator 
asked whether housing associations actually engage in social housing.143
Note, with reference to the discussion in Section II, that even if housing 
in the Netherlands is nearly completely commercialized, the government 
has still provided a legal framework and sanctioned the operation of 
these associations, thereby engaging in regulation.144
134. Id.
135. Id. at 12.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 13.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 15. 
143. See Hugo Priemus, How to Abolish Social Housing? The Dutch Case, 19 
INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 145, 155 (1995). 
144. See supra Section II. 
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ii. Mechanisms and Principles of the Dutch Housing
Association Regulation
The Dutch system is unique in its complete rejection of supply-side 
subsidies as a source of funding for affordable housing.145 The subsidies 
that remain are limited in scope and application.146 For example, some 
demand-side subsidies are still provided to aid individuals in covering 
the cost of rent.147 In 2000, roughly one-third of tenants within housing 
associations received rent subsidies, covering, on average, 40% of their 
total rent.148 The primary purpose of the rent subsidy is to ensure that a 
low income does not preclude a person from seeking quality housing.149
Notably, the Dutch system has created an incentive for these individuals 
to seek more costly residences, by providing larger rent subsidization for 
those individuals.150 While perhaps facially illogical, these larger 
subsidies prevent significant concentrations of poverty that would occur 
if low-income individuals only resided in the least expensive available 
dwellings.151 In this way, the larger rent subsidy ensures a greater degree 
of socio-economic diversity within neighborhoods.152
Rather than relying on object subsidies, as in Austria, Dutch housing 
associations finance their operations by investing their own funds in new 
construction and improvements.153 This concept is known as the 
“Revolving Fund Principle.”154 Where additional funding is required by 
the associations, it may be obtained from a bank at a reduced interest rate 
through a guaranteed loan system administered by the Social Housing 
Guarantee Fund (WSW), a private organization.155 The WSW is a non-
profit organization to which housing associations pay a membership fee 
145. See OUWEHAND & VAN DAALEN, supra note 123, at 79. 
146. See id. at 45, 79. 
147. Id. at 45–45. 
148. Id. at 45. 
149. Id.  
150. Id.
151. But cf. id. at 46. 
152. Id.
153. Id. at 87. 
154. Id. at 79–80. 
155. Id. at 82–83; see also CECODHAS HOUS. EUR. OBSERVATORY, STUDY ON
FINANCING OF SOCIAL HOUSING IN 6 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 16 (2013), 
http://www.housingeurope.eu/resource-369/financing-of-social-housing. 
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to belong to and additional fees to secure guarantyship.156 However, 
“[t]he State does play a part in providing a financial safety net for [it].”157
The WSW’s suretyship is conditioned on the applicant association’s
satisfaction of a number of financial requirements.158 If an association is 
unable to satisfy those requirements, it may make an appeal to the 
Central Housing Fund (CFV) for financial assistance.159 All housing 
associations are required to contribute to the CFV, and these 
contributions enable it to offer such assistance.160 The support provided 
by the CFV may be in the form of either an interest-free loan or a grant 
made in lump sum payments.161 The CFV also operates in a supervisory 
capacity for the government.162 By identifying “financially weak housing 
associations,” the government can then step in and work with the 
association to correct its policy and re-secure its financial stability.163
The traditional administrative model of Dutch housing associations 
relies on significant participation by the tenants and members of the 
community at large.164 At the top of the hierarchy is a supervisory 
board—the “council of commissioners.”165 The law requires the council 
to seat at least five members, and two seats are reserved for persons 
nominated by the tenants of the association.166 The non-tenant 
commissioners are professionals in the community, and they are required 
to hold a job outside of the housing association.167 They are generally 
selected by the director for their specific expertise to satisfy the needs of 
the association—”management, finance, the social sphere, [and] the 
technical sphere” are all areas of expertise that the members of the 
156. OUWEHAND & VAN DAALEN, supra note 123, at 83.
157. Id. at 85.
158. Id. at 84.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. The CFV issues biannual reports that identify the solvency and liquidity of 
each housing association. The CFV issues biannual reports that identify the solvency and 
liquidity of each housing association. CECODHAS HOUS. EUR. OBSERVATORY, supra
note 155, at 16. 
163. OUWEHAND & VAN DAALEN, supra note 123, at 84–85.
164. See id. at 36–38. 
165. See id. at 36–37. 
166. Id. at 37. 
167. Id.
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council should be versed in.168 At the bottom of the hierarchy, there are 
eleven tenants committees, together forming the tenants council, which 
advises the director on general concerns and policy.169 The tenants 
council selects two commissioners for the supervisory counsel.170 In 
practice, a council of commissioners is comprised of seven or nine 
commissioners.171
The administration of housing associations requires the cooperation of 
a diverse group, including tenants, community professionals, and 
housing association employees. This diversity of participation has the 
potential to create shared interests in a strong and successful community 
and neighborhood. Significantly, this cooperation is both a product of, 
and possible because of, a “consultation culture”172—one “in which 
reaching consensus [is] more highly prized than getting one’s own 
way.”173 There are concerns that ethnic minorities may be 
underrepresented, as they are generally less familiar with this culture of 
consultation.174 Additionally, there may still be conflicts between the 
interests of the housing association administration and the interests of the 
tenants. This is particularly concerning, where, as is the current trend, 
small to mid-size housing associations are merging and larger 
associations are managing more and more developments while 
simultaneously becoming more market oriented.175 As housing 
associations grow larger, there is a risk that these large corporations will 
be less in touch with the interests and concerns of the tenants and 
community. This will be an area to watch out for future developments, as 
there is some apprehension that the associations will attempt to shift 
power away from the tenants and consolidate it with the director and the 
larger umbrella associations. One response has been to offer certification 
168. Id.
169. Id. 
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 78. 
173. Nick van Sas, The Netherlands: A Historical Phenomenon, in DUTCH 
CULTURE IN A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE: ACCOUNTING FOR THE PAST: 1650-2000 41, 41
(Douwe Fokkema & Frans Grijzenhout eds., Paul Vincent trans., 2004).
174. See OUWEHAND & VAN DAALEN, supra note 123, at 78.
175. Id. at 25, 73.
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to housing associations based on their service and responsiveness to 
tenants.176
iii. Social Context within the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, housing associations own 32% of the total housing 
stock.177 Furthermore, housing associations provide more than 75% of 
rented dwellings.178 Notably, “[t]he Netherlands is a country dominated 
by single-family houses,” and 45% of the dwellings rented by housing 
associations are single family homes.179 In the Netherlands, far more of 
the housing association-owned dwellings are occupied by low-income 
residents compared to Austria.180
Dutch history is demonstrative of various competing ideological 
strains. From the late 1800s through early 1900s, there was a shift away 
from the rigid dichotomy between working class and the “traditional 
culture of dignitaries.”181 This period evidenced an expansion of the role 
of the middle-class professionals, particularly in promoting the social 
welfare through increased involvement in education and housing.182
During this period, Dutch “society was organized on a rational basis, 
strongly determined by free-market relations, grounded in legal equality 
and ruled by government bureaucracy.”183 Accordingly, Dutch history, 
much like that of Austria, has a strong neo-corporatist strain.184
Yet, Dutch society and politics have historically also embraced a 
humanitarian strain.185 From the 1950s through the 1970s, the Dutch 
176. Id. at 73.
177. Marja Elsinga & Frank Wassenberg, Social Housing in the Netherlands, in
SOCIAL HOUSING IN EUROPE 25, 25 (Kathleen Scanlon et al. eds., 2014).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 25–26. 
180. See id. at 35. Compare at least 40% low-income residents in the Netherlands 
to a mere 11% in Austria. Id.; Reinprecht, supra note 106, at 70. 
181. PIET DE ROOY, A TINY SPOT ON THE EARTH: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE
NETHERLANDS IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURY 169 (2015). 
182. Id. at 188.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 187. See supra note 114 for a brief definition of corporatism and neo-
corporatism.
185. DE ROOY, supra note 181, at 188. 
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economy enjoyed a period of growth.186 During these two decades, the 
government invested heavily in social policies such as social security, 
public housing, healthcare, and education.187 Between 1973 and 1981, 
this growth decreased and even contracted as the government’s financial 
position worsened.188 The exigent nature of this economically stagnant 
period was a significant motivation for the shift towards suretyship as a 
means to decrease the financial burden of housing on the government.189
This juxtaposition of corporatism and humanitarianism in Dutch history 
sheds light on the housing associations, which are, essentially, regulated 
corporations that act to promote social welfare by providing affordable 
housing. While the government is less involved, the humanitarian strain 
in Dutch society is still witnessed in the mission of the housing 
associations.190
Additionally, the consultation culture is also influential in the political 
sphere. The “polder model” refers to “the Dutch practice of 
policymaking by consensus between government, employers and trade 
unions.”191 Consensus-building is further facilitated by the broad desire 
for consultation, the small size of the Netherlands, sensible trade unions, 
and the fact that there are numerous political parties resulting from 
proportional representation.192 The Social and Economic Council (SER) 
is similar to the Austrian Partnership193, and its membership includes 
representatives on behalf of employers, employees, and the government; 
moreover, the SER strengthens the relationship between commercial 
interests and labor by promoting consultation.194 The purpose of the SER 
186. Id. at 232. Note that the U.S. economy also prospered during the same period. 
See also introduction infra Section IV. 
187. DE ROOY, supra note 181, at 232.
188. Id. at 260. 
189. See supra Section III.B.i. 
190. For example, Vestia, a housing association in the Netherlands, states that its 
purpose is to promote “good quality homes in pleasant neighbourhoods, for households 
with a low (middle) income and/or a vulnerable position in society.” About Us, VESTIA,
https://www.vestia.nl/#!PageID=8613&content=&contentid1=&contentid2= (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2017). 
191. Model Makers, THE ECONOMIST (May 2, 2002), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1098153. 
192. Id.
193. See discussion infra Section III.A.iii. 
194. See discussion infra Section III.A.iii. 
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is to provide advice and guidance in policymaking, which is often highly 
persuasive to lawmakers, although not binding.195
iv. Concluding Thoughts
Dutch culture has long emphasized the importance of acting to 
promote the public welfare. While private actors were the first to 
recognize housing for the working class as a critical issue and to take up 
the cause, the government soon responded and provided a framework 
within which housing associations could operate to achieve their 
objectives. The Dutch approach has also been reactive to changing 
circumstances and has undergone significant reform over time. The 
experience of the past one-hundred-odd years has been an exercise in 
striking the proper balance between public and private interests, 
evidencing a trend of increased privatization. The loan guarantee method 
of financing and the reinvestment of funds, along with the low reliance 
on subsidization, show that after a period of government involvement, 
the scales are again tipped towards the private sector. The Dutch housing 
associations are also unique in their assistance to lower income residents. 
Specifically, by providing a mechanism whereby lower income residents 
can afford to reside in nicer neighborhoods, the Dutch approach ensures 
the presence of various socio-economic backgrounds in each community. 
Furthermore, consultation culture and the importance of consensus-
building promotes broad participation in the affairs of housing 
associations, as tenants directly contribute to their management. 
Affordable Housing in the United States C.
The history and trajectory of American affordable housing initiatives 
may be indicative of how viable of an option housing associations could 
be in the United States. One commentator has noted, with respect to 
affordable housing in the United States: 
Affordable housing is not deemed to be an end in itself, but a way to 
serve another purpose—for example, to house defense workers during 
the world wars, to create jobs during the Depression, to provide an 
195. See discussion infra Section III.A.iii. 
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antidote to civil unrest in the 1960s, or to stimulate the economy in 
today’s Great Recession.196
This stands in stark contrast to the beginnings of Austrian and Dutch 
social housing endeavors, which were primarily altruistically motivated 
and were representative of a popular desire to ensure that all Austrian 
and Dutch individuals and families could obtain adequate housing.197 In 
these two countries, affordable housing is an end in itself. The following 
sections contain a brief history of affordable housing policy in the United 
States. 
i. Historical Development of Affordable Housing in the
United States
The National Housing Act of 1934 (NHA), a product of the New 
Deal, created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which served 
the initial purpose of “insur[ing] single-family housing loans.”198 Single-
family homes occupied the apex of the pyramid of the Euclidean zoning 
scheme.199 Indeed, in the beginning, the FHA was “an insurance 
company with middle-class housing its prime concern.”200 The United 
States Housing Act (USHA), enacted in 1937 under President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, was “the nation’s prime affordable housing effort.”201
Notably, however, the preamble to the USHA states that its goal of 
196. Edson, supra note 32, at 194. 
197. See supra Sections III.A, III.B. 
198. Edson, supra note 32, at 195. 
199. Charles Ten Brink, Gayborhoods: Intersections of Land Use Regulation, 
Sexual Minorities, and the Creative Class, 28 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 789, 794 (2012). Euclid
was decided 1926, less than ten years prior to the passage of the NHA. Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). After Euclid, municipalities widely adopted use-
based zoning classifications that offered significant protection to owners of single-family 
homes. Ten Brink, supra, at 794. Courts, confronted with these schemes, often referred to 
apartment-style housing in a vocabulary like that used to describe a common-law 
nuisance. Id.; Euclid, 272 U.S. 388 (Confronted with a village zoning plan that regulated 
and restricted apartment houses, among other things, the Supreme Court famously stated 
“A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, -- like a pig in the parlor 
instead of the barnyard.”). It is unsurprising, then, that the NHA promoted single-family 
housing. 
200. Edson, supra note 32, at 195. 
201. Id. 
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providing decent housing is second to its first purpose of job creation.202
As noted by Seymour Martin Lipset, with reference to much of the New 
Deal legislation, “Roosevelt clearly wanted to maintain a capitalist 
economy.”203 Presumably, it would have been easier to justify the USHA 
as a jobs creation program—seemingly much more capitalist than 
government-funded housing projects. The program was administered by 
local authorities after the Sixth Circuit ruled Public Works 
Administration ownership of government housing unconstitutional.204 At 
this early stage, the primary beneficiaries of the USHA were 
predominantly nuclear families struggling to make ends meet during the 
Great Depression.205
A major sea change occurred in the mid-1960s as “[r]elatively easy 
home-ownership terms” enabled middle-class families to depart from 
government subsidized housing.206 At the same time, the trend was the 
development of large multistory developments.207 After this great 
departure, the population of these projects was comprised largely of 
single-parent households on welfare.208 By the early 1980s, there was an 
urgent need for public housing available specifically to lower-income 
and very poor families.209 Accordingly, what resulted was large public 
housing developments occupied by a significant and concentrated 
population of low-income residents.210 As discussed previously, by the 
early 1980s these large projects were being criticized for their 
dehumanizing architecture and warehouse-like conceptualization.211
202. Id.
203. LIPSET, supra note 34, at 37–38 (referring broadly to the aims of New Deal 
legislation). 
204. Edson, supra note 32, at 195. 
205. Id. at 196. 
206. Id.
207. Id. at 197–98.
208. Id. at 196. 
209. Id.
210. See id. at 196–98. 
211. See Venkatesh & Celimli, supra note 10. However, many long-term residents 
of these now-demolished projects say that they miss the sense of community they felt 
while living there. Mortice, supra note 11; see also discussion supra note 11. 
134 Michigan State ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ5HYLHZ [Vol. 26.1
In 1986, Congress introduced the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC)—a dollar for dollar tax liability reduction.212 The LIHTC is a 
form of supply-side subsidy.213 The LIHTC ensures that Congress’
interest in creating housing for low-income people is served by 
establishing area median incomes (AMIs) to limit tenancy.214 To 
illustrate, “federal law requires that 40[%] of new public housing 
entrants and 75[%] of [S]ection 8 voucher recipients must have incomes 
at or below 30[%] of AMI.”215 Furthermore, the LIHTC achieves its goal 
by “limiting the credit to qualified low-income units, and recapturing the 
credit if units are not occupied by low-income persons.”216 Many 
consider the LIHTC to have been a major success, and despite a number 
of obstacles, the LIHTC is still available today.217 Indeed, the LIHTC has 
been utilized to provide 90% of all affordable housing since its 
introduction,218 and a very sophisticated industry has grown around 
investing in such projects.219
In 1993, the HOPE VI program was implemented, with the dual-
purpose of demolishing distressed housing and constructing improved 
residences.220 Proponents of the HOPE VI program broadly regarded the 
existing large housing developments as a failure. Accordingly, these new 
developments physically evidenced the popular rejection and perceived 
212. Edson, supra note 32, at 205. A tax credit reduces total tax liability; for 
example, a $1,000 credit reduces tax liability by $1,000. Tax Credits vs. Tax Deductions,
US TAX CENTER, https://www.irs.com/articles/tax-credits-vs-tax-deductions (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2017). 
213. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING, supra note 13, at 722. 
214. FURMAN CTR. & MOELIS INST., WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT THE LOW-
INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM BY LOOKING AT THE TENANTS? 2 (Oct. 2012), 
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/LIHTC_Final_Policy_Brief_v2.pdf.  
215. Id. Note that there is a significant disparity between the typical mortgage 
payment for a home (15%) and the typical monthly rent for a home (30%). Id. 
216. Edson, supra note 32, at 205–06.
217. See id. at 205–07. 
218. Editorial, A Tax Credit Worth Preserving, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/opinion/a-tax-credit-worth-preserving.html?_r=0. 
219. For a more technical discussion of how the LIHTC is utilized by property 
developers, investors, and the syndicators who bundle and sell these investment vehicles, 
see WILLIAM J. GUTHLEIN & KEVIN M. BINGHAM, THE LIHTC PROGRAM AND
CONSIDERATIONS FOR GUARANTORS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING FUNDS (2002), 
http://www.casact.org/pubs/dpp/dpp02/02dpp1.pdf. 
220. Edson, supra note 32, at 197. 
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failure of the towering complexes of the 1950s and -60s.221 Specifically, 
the new developments emphasized “low-rise, less dense units.”222 These 
aims are generally accomplished by partnering a public housing 
association (PHA) with a developer in a limited partnership.223 PHAs 
with “severely distressed public housing units” can apply for HOPE VI 
grants, which are of two varieties.224 The Revitalization grants fund costs 
associated with demolition of distressed public housing and the 
relocation of those residents, as well as site acquisition necessary for 
construction.225 Main Street grants are targeted at smaller communities 
undertaking efforts to revitalize “older, downtown business districts.”226
Moreover, the new HOPE VI developments embraced mixed-income 
221. See id. at 197–98. 
222. Id. at 197. The HOPE VI program draws heavily upon principles and 
objectives of New Urbanism, including:  
[N]eighborhoods should be diverse in use and population; 
communities should be designed for the pedestrian and transit as 
well as the car; cities and towns should be shaped by physically 
defined and universally accessible public spaces and community 
institutions; urban places should be framed by architecture and 
landscape design that celebrate local history, climate, ecology, 
and building practice. 
The Charter of the New Urbanism, CONG. FOR NEW URBANISM,
https://www.cnu.org/who-we-are/charter-new-urbanism (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). For 
a discussion of New Urbanism, diverse communities, and land use planning, see Ten 
Brink, supra note 199. 
223. Edson, supra note 32, at 197. 
224. About HOPE VI, HUD.GOV, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/prog
rams/ph/hope6/about (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). 
225. Id.
226. HOPE VI Main Street Program, HUD.GOV, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV.,
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/prog
rams/ph/hope6/grants/mainstreet (last visited Sept. 25, 2017). Qualifying local 
governments must have a population of 50,000 or less and 100 or fewer public housing 
units. FY 2016 Main Street Funding Information, HUD.GOV, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN. DEV.,
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/prog
rams/ph/hope6/grants/fy16 (last visited Sept. 25, 2017). In fiscal year 2016-2017 
approximately $500,000 in awards was available. Id. In 2016, only three applications 
were received and one municipality was awarded funds. Id. 
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arrangements.227 These mixed-income developments continue to be the 
trend.228
ii. The Primary Source of Affordable Housing in the US—
the Housing Voucher System
There seems to be a “general consensus in the housing field that if 
there is an adequate supply of existing housing in an area, vouchers 
should be utilized to make the units affordable for low-income 
families.”229 Vouchers are a form of demand-side subsidy.230 Under the 
Section 8 certificate system, the development or unit owner enters into a 
housing assistance payment contract with, most commonly, the local 
public housing authority.231 The contract identifies a Fair Market Rent for 
the area, established by the United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD).232 The tenant family then pays an amount 
equal to 30% of the family income for rent and utilities.233 The owner 
receives the remainder of the rent payment from the local public housing 
authority.234 The voucher system is substantially similar to the certificate 
system and differs primarily insofar as the tenant is able to choose a 
residency with a rent payment greater than the previously discussed 
payment standard.235 If the tenant so chooses, then the tenant must pay 
30% of the family income plus the difference between the payment 
227. Edson, supra note 32, at 198. 
228. E.g., Mortice, supra note 11. For a comprehensive report of the first decade 
of the HOPE VI program, see SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., A DECADE OF HOPE VI: RESEARCH 
FINDINGS AND POLICY CHALLENGES (May 2004), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411002-A-Decade-of-
HOPE-VI.PDF. 
229. Edson, supra note 32, at 210. Recall that in the Netherlands, subsidies are 
also utilized to make housing affordable for the low-income families. See supra Section 
III.B.i.
230. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING, supra note 13, at 122–23.
231. Edson, supra note 32, at 210. 
232. Id.
233. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, HUD.GOV, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV.,
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/prog
rams/hcv/about/fact_sheet (last visited Sept. 25, 2017). 
234. Edson, supra note 32, at 210. 
235. See id. 
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standard and the actual rent.236 In this case, the public housing authority 
pays the same amount under the voucher program as under the certificate 
program.237 However, a “family may not pay more than 40[%] of its 
adjusted monthly income for rent.”238
By 2010, over 2 million units were participating in the voucher 
program.239 Proponents of vouchers claim that residents can use them to 
live in the neighborhood of their choice, yet these aims have not been 
fully realized.240 Specifically, “the fair market rent cut-off point often 
consigns voucher-holders to impoverished neighborhoods.”241 This 
means that families would have to elect to pay the difference in rent at a 
more expensive location; however, in practice, these families generally 
elect to stay in familiar neighborhoods.242 For this reason, demand-side 
subsidies such as vouchers are unlikely to reduce gentrification.243
Furthermore, the lengthy waiting lists alone could deter applicants.244
Earlier in this article, the notion of municipalities using land controls 
to preclude low-income developments was introduced.245 In a similar 
vein, many landlords may reject Section 8 housing vouchers to preclude 
low-income residents from entering their communities.246 Under the 
Federal Fair Housing Act, landlords are not required to accept Section 8 
vouchers.247 However, state or local laws may afford tenants additional 
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, supra note 233.
239. Edson, supra note 32, at 211. 
240. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING, supra note 13, at 124. 
241. Alana Semuels, How Housing Policy is Failing America’s Poor, THE
ATLANTIC (June 24, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/section-8-is-failing/396650/. 
242. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING, supra note 13, at 124. 
243. Id.
244. Id. For example, in Lansing, Michigan, the Section 8 waiting list is only open 
periodically, for as few as several days or one week at a time. Lansing Housing 
Commission, AFFORDABLE HOUSING ONLINE,
http://affordablehousingonline.com/housing-authority/Michigan/Lansing-Housing-
Commission/MI058/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2017). This information was accurate at the 
time of writing, January 28, 2017. Even then, only those applicants who were selected by 
a random lottery are placed on the waiting list. Id.
245. See supra Section I. 
246. Semuels, supra note 241. 
247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631. Moreover, a factor contributing to areas of 
concentrated poverty is the reality that “landlords in low-income areas aggressively 
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protection by prohibiting discrimination based on payment by voucher. 
As of 2015, a mere nine states have passed legislation that limits the 
landlord’s ability to refuse payment by voucher.248 Some counties and 
municipalities have enacted similar ordinances to prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of payment by voucher.249 Nevertheless, for those families 
living in jurisdictions in which such legislation does not apply, this 
unfortunate consequence of the voucher is yet another obstacle to 
affordable housing that leads to a concentration of poor families in the 
poorest neighborhoods.250
Today, some 1.1 million units of public housing are owned by 3,148 
local authorities.251 While new legislation and ordinances may continue 
to limit voucher discrimination, private landlords will likely still be 
plagued by the same fears that Section 8 tenants could have the effect of 
repelling market-rate paying tenants. While it may be reprehensible that 
a landlord would reject a voucher tenant merely because he can only 
afford the residence with the assistance of the voucher, it is still 
worthwhile to consider this situation from the landlord’s perspective. 
Landlords may be concerned about causing property values to 
decrease—the voucher system does little, if anything, to improve the 
stigma against the poor or racial minorities.252 The local and state 
governments, as well as the federal government, should strive to do 
better than merely provide a home. The goal should be to foster the 
development of sustainable communities. To be sure, the federal 
government should continue to assist in providing low-income families 
access to housing. Though tax credits aid in the construction of new 
affordable housing development and voucher subsidies assist in filling
these units, the current system leaves something to be desired. Merely 
placing a low-income tenant into a home does little or nothing to foster a 
recruit voucher-holders, as the vouchers are a much more reliable source of rent than 
other low-income tenants have available.” Semuels, supra note 241. 
248. Nathan Brunet, Law Aims to End Section 8 Source of Income Discrimination,
AFFORDABLE HOUSING ONLINE (Mar. 11, 2016),
http://affordablehousingonline.com/blog/law-aims-to-end-section-8-source-of-income-
discrimination/. These states are Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Vermont. Id.
249. See, e.g., Section 5-8-030, Chicago Municipal Code.
250. See Semuels, supra note 241. 
251. Edson, supra note 32, at 195. 
252. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING, supra note 13, at 126. 
2017] Importing the Legal Framework 139
sense of community. Perhaps by embracing more economically diverse 
tenants and creating a shared interest in community among broader 
income groups, this stigma against the poor could be mitigated.  
iii. Other Sources of Federal Support for Affordable Housing
HUD also administers two other grant programs—the HOME 
Investment Partnerships Program (HOME)253 and the Housing Trust 
Fund (HTF).254 Additionally, there are two other relevant developments 
in affordable housing: Community Development Financial Institutions 
(CDFI)255 and Community Development Corporations (CDC).256
1. HOME Investment Partnerships Program
HOME is a block grant program that provides 40% of its funding to 
states and 60% to localities (participating jurisdictions) for “building, 
buying, and/or rehabilitating affordable housing for rent or 
homeownership or providing direct rental assistance to low-income 
people.”257 The primary feature of HOME is the flexibility that it affords 
States and localities in determining how to utilize the funds, including 
uses such as “grants, direct loans, loan guarantees or other forms of 
credit enhancements, or rental assistance or security deposits.”258
Notably, participating jurisdictions are required to match $0.25 of every 
dollar of funding provided by HOME.259 In the context of rental housing, 
HOME funds, typically in the form of long-term, non-interest-bearing 
loans, are often utilized in conjunction with the LIHTC.260 HOME 
assistance requires that a minimum of 90% of renters have incomes equal 
to or less than 60% of the HUD-adjusted median family income for the 
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 211 (2012). 
254. 12 U.S.C. § 4568 (2008). 
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 4701 (1971). 
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 9801 (1981).
257. HOME Investment Partnerships Program, HUD.GOV, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS.
& URBAN DEV.,
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/affordableh
ousing/programs/home (last visited Sept. 25, 2017); Edson, supra note 32, at 203. 
258. HOME Investment Partnerships Program, supra note 257. 
259. Id.
260. Edson, supra note 32, at 203. 
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area, whereas the income of all homeowners receiving HOME assistance 
must be equal to or less than 80% of the HUD- adjusted median.261
2. Housing Trust Fund
In the Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Congress created the HTF, 
yet another grant program.262 The HTF is targeted specifically at 
providing housing to the poorest Americans as part of a plan to eliminate 
the “Worst-Case Housing Crisis.”263 It was not until 2016 that HUD 
allocated funds to the HTF.264 The funds are allocated to states by 
formula, and a minimum of 80% is required to be utilized for rental 
housing while a maximum of 10% may be used for homeownership 
housing and grantee’s administrative and planning costs.265 Much like the 
HOME grant, the HTF permits flexibility in using the funds to produce 
or preserve affordable housing.266 However, industry commentators have 
suggested that the Fund would be used primarily to create new 
housing.267 Because the HTF has only been funded so recently, this will 
be an area that should be continually monitored for new developments. 
261. Home Investment Partnerships Program, supra note 257. 
262. Edson, supra note 32 at 204; see also National Housing Trust Fund 
Factsheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/National-Housing-Fund-Trust-
Factsheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2017). 
263. Kriston Capps, How the Federal Government Plans to Stop the ‘Worst-Case’ 
Housing Crisis, CITYLAB (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2016/04/hud-
launches-the-national-housing-trust-fund-to-support-extremely-low-income-
renters/476817/. Worst-case housing includes “families that pay more than half their 
income toward rent as well as households that live in substandard or unsafe housing.” Id.
The Crisis was recognized by HUD in a 2015 report to Congress. See BARRY STEFFEN ET
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS: 2015 REPORT TO
CONGRESS (2015), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/Publications/pdf/WorstCaseNeeds_2015.pdf.
264. Press Release, Brian Sullivan, HUD Allocates $174 Million Through New 
Housing Trust Fund (May 4, 2016), 
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2016/
HUDNo_16-068. 
265. National Housing Trust Fund Factsheet, supra note 262. 
266. Id. 
267. Capps, supra note 263. 
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3. Community Development Financial Institutions
A relatively recent innovation, CDFIs were introduced with the 
passage of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1994.268 CFDIs are private organizations that draw 
on community resources to generate the money necessary to finance 
community projects.269 CDFIs are not purely affordable housing 
mechanisms; rather, they can be used to finance entrepreneurs including 
small businesses and microenterprises, individuals, and nonprofit 
organizations.270 Broadly, CDFIs further pursue community development 
and economic development therein.271 In the context of housing, CDFIs 
operate primarily in underserved, economically distressed markets.272
CDFIs obtain capital from a diverse set of sources including: “national 
and community banks, socially-motivated individuals, religious 
institutions, foundations and corporations.”273 This money is loaned to 
the CDFI at below-market interest rates.274 For the term of the loan, the 
CDFI makes regular interest payments and repays the capital at the end 
of the term.275 The Department of the Treasury also administers the CDFI 
Fund, which consists of seven programs that assist CDFIs in financing 
their loans.276
268. H.R. 3474, 103d Cong. (1994) (enacted) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4701–
4719). See also What are CDFIs?, CDFI FUND,
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/CDFI_infographic_v08A.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 
2017). 
269. What are CDFIs?, CDFI COALITION, http://www.cdfi.org/about-
cdfis/what-are-cdfis/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2017). 
270. Mercy Loan Fund, MERCY HOUS.,
https://www.mercyhousing.org/community-development-financial-institution (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2017). 
271. Id.
272. Id. One such CDFI “only provides loans to socially responsible, affordable 
housing developers in support of their mission to create stable, vibrant and healthy 
communities for families, seniors and people with special needs who lack the economic 
resources to access quality, safe housing opportunities.” Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See Programs, CDFIFUND.GOV, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/Programs/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2017). 
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4. Community Development Corporations
A CDC is “a nonprofit, community-based urban development 
organization that engages in economic development activities such as 
housing production, commercial property development, business 
development, and/or job creation for the benefit of community 
residents.”277 CDCs have played a role in providing affordable housing 
since the 1960s.278 The CDC is recognized as a “hybrid legal form that 
allows it to function as a quasi-business and quasi-nonprofit.”279
Financing for CDCs relies largely upon federal grants and the other 
mechanisms for providing affordable housing discussed above. There is a 
concern that as CDCs expand, they will lose sight of their community-
oriented mission.280 Accordingly, federal law has attached conditions to
certain CDC grants to ensure that they continue to promote their 
mission.281 CDCs are not nationally certified, though some states have 
endeavored to create certification processes.282 Furthermore, CDCs are 
required to keep records as well as publish accounting policies and 
procedures necessary for the CDC to exercise “effective control over and 
accountability for all funds, property and other assets.”283 However, one 
commentator has called for “more consistency and greater accountability 
for how [federal] funding is distributed.”284 Moreover, while CDCs 
operate throughout the country, they are primarily found within the 
Northeast and Midwest.285 CDC’s share a similar mission and 
organizational structure as housing associations. These are perhaps the 
closest relatives of the Dutch and Austrian housing associations, and any 
attempt to reform affordable housing in the United States based on 
housing associations should consider the parallels between these 
organizations. 
277. Yael Krigman, The Role of Community Development Corporations in 
Affordable Housing, 19 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 231, 242 (2010). 
278. Id. at 239.
279. Id. at 243.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 245.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 247.
285. Id. at 240. 
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iv. Concluding Thoughts
The history of the American approach to affordable housing is 
noteworthy in several respects. From the outset, the promotion of 
affordable housing was not a primary purpose of federal housing 
legislation. While early housing legislation aimed at increasing the 
affordability of single-family homes, during the middle- to late-twentieth 
century the purpose shifted to primarily encouraging the development 
and maintenance of housing for America’s poorest residents. Moreover, 
efforts to promote affordable housing have consistently relied on grants 
and subsidies. With respect to rental housing, the bulk of the funding 
comes from demand-side programs, such as the voucher system. 
New affordable housing developments are only possible insofar as 
developers or housing finance firms are willing to navigate the labyrinth 
of state and federal financing opportunities. One major downside of the 
current approach, because these projects are only financially feasible 
insofar as credits, subsidies, and grants are available, is that an entire 
project can fall apart if one of these financing mechanisms is not 
obtained. As a result, these projects may be abandoned long after 
beginning the planning and application process and considerable 
expenses have already been paid. 
One of the benefits of the federalist system of government in the 
United States is that it gives states wide latitude in formulating highly 
individualized plans to address the needs of their residents. At the same 
time, the federal government may ensure a degree of uniformity among 
states. In the context of housing, federal policy has embraced flexibility 
in planning and implementation at the state level. While this flexibility is 
useful for states that have sophisticated affordable housing programs, this 
decentralized approach is less helpful in states that do not have a 
sophisticated affordable housing industry.286
286. See generally Megan Wells, Top 10 Best States for Affordable Housing,
EFFICIENTGOV (Aug. 11, 2016), http://efficientgov.com/blog/2016/08/11/top-10-best-
states-affordable-housing/. 
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REFORMING AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATESIV.
Perhaps the American approach to affordable housing is a product of 
traditional notions of American exceptionalism and a “pull oneself up by 
one’s bootstraps” mentality.287 At the same time that Austria and the 
Netherlands were concerned about providing housing for the working 
classes, Americans were concerned with eliminating working-class 
radicalism.288 When Austria and the Netherlands were working to 
provide post-World War II housing, America was experiencing an 
“economic miracle”—the period between 1945 and the 1980s, during 
which the economy grew and flourished.289 Perhaps what differentiates 
the Austrian and Dutch experiences is that the United States has 
embraced a more self-reliant culture. In the US, housing assistance is 
primarily aimed at getting the lowest-income individuals and families off 
the streets and into homes. Conversely, the Austrian and Dutch 
experience has embraced as its object providing quality homes to the 
poor and working classes.290 For this reason, adopting any aspect of 
Austrian or Dutch housing association law will require Americans to 
broaden their understanding of affordable housing to include more than 
merely the low-income. 
Additionally, housing associations rely on a careful balance between 
public and private interests, through which corporations are entrusted to 
pursue the public good.291 Much of the discussion herein implicates 
corporations and their perceived role within society. One relevant 
development in the area of American corporate law is the creation of 
public benefit corporations (PBCs).292 These companies are not solely 
287. See Noliwe M. Rooks, The Myth of Bootstrapping, TIME (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://ideas.time.com/2012/09/07/the-myth-of-bootstrapping/. 
288. LIPSET, supra note 34, at 33. 
289. Id. at 38. 
290. See discussion supra Sections III.A.i,iii, III.B.i,iii, III.C.i. 
291. See discussion supra Sections III.A.ii,iii, III.B.ii,iii. 
292. See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP.,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Sept. 26. 2017). At 
this time, thirty-three states have passed laws recognizing public benefit corporations, 
and another eight are working on passing such laws. Id.
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beholden to the purpose of maximizing the shareholders’ value.293
Rather, a PBC expressly binds itself to further an additional social duty, 
which theoretically gives it more decisional flexibility.294 Implicit in the 
understanding of the PBC is the notion that the benefits of the corporate 
form—its efficiency and efficacy—should be permitted to create social 
value.295 Moreover, the demand for socially conscious companies is 
growing. A recent study found that 70% of millennials were willing to 
spend more on brands that support causes,296 and 81% “expect companies 
to make a public commitment to good corporate citizenship.”297 With 
millennials representing a significant and growing share of the consumer 
market, millennials “represent the consumer market of the future.”298
Millennials’ willingness to entrust corporations to promote the social 
good by creating and managing affordable housing is critical if housing 
associations are to have any place in the United States. 
The notion that the corporate form can be entrusted to promote the 
social good is precisely the notion underlying Dutch and Austrian 
housing associations.299 While the United States has taken a largely 
divergent path in providing affordable housing thus far, millennials may 
be the key to reform. The recognition of PBCs, as well as the pressing 
urgency of gentrification and urban sprawl, could present an opportunity 
for a change in policy. Together, these developments could be indicative 
of a coming sea change in United States affordable housing policy. 
293. Letter from Stephen I. Glover et al., Att’y at Gibson Dunn, to Clients and 
Friends 2 (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/Corporate-
Paradigm-Shift--Public-Benefit-Corporations.aspx. 
294. Id. “For example, Delaware’s PBC statute requires a PBC to simultaneously 
consider its shareholders’ return on investment, its impact upon those materially affected 
by its operations, and the specific public benefit or benefits set forth in its certificate of 
incorporation.” Id. at 1. 
295. See generally id.
296. Katie Richards, How Agencies Are Meeting Millennials’ Demand for Socially 
Responsible Marketing, ADWEEK (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.adweek.com/brand-
marketing/agencies-are-carving-out-niche-socially-responsible-marketing-168592/. 
297. Ryan Rudominer, Corporate Social Responsibility Matters: Ignore 
Millennials at Your Peril, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 5, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryan-rudominer/corporate-social-
responsi_9_b_9155670.html (internal citation omitted). 
298. Id.
299. See discussion supra Sections III.A.ii, III.B.ii. 
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United States’ legislators should look to these two countries—and 
particularly the Netherlands—as models for reform.  
Lessons from the Austrian and Dutch Experiences A.
In balancing the scale between public and private control, the Dutch 
and Austrians have set the scale differently. The Dutch model, 
particularly since implementing the guaranteed loan, has emphasized a 
partnership that tips the scale towards private interests.300 While Dutch 
housing associations operate within a state regulatory framework, they 
are private corporations and have wide latitude to pursue their 
objectives.301 The Social Housing Guarantee Fund, which administers the 
guarantee, is a non-profit organization.302 All housing associations belong 
and make monetary contributions to the Central Housing Fund, which is 
a private support network for housing associations.303 The Dutch 
regulatory framework is both the most commercialized, yet its 
universalistic policy is the broadest allocation criteria among these three 
countries.304
The organizational hierarchy of the Dutch housing association ensures 
broad participation among its various stakeholders.305 In this way, both 
tenants and housing association professionals within the community are 
united in a common purpose of providing quality, affordable housing.306
Moreover, this unity of interests should extend to the promotion of the 
safety and welfare of the neighborhood and community. Furthermore, the 
long history of private support for social housing development and the 
current absence of reliance on object subsidization demonstrate a 
longstanding societal interest in developing attractive, safe, and 
marketable social housing.307
The most noteworthy aspect of the Dutch approach is its novel 
approach to funding its housing associations. The guaranteed loan system 
300. See discussion supra Section III.B.ii. 
301. See discussion supra Section III.B.ii. 
302. CECODHAS HOUS. EUR. OBSERVATORY, supra note 155, at 16. 
303. Id. at 15–16. 
304. See discussion supra Sections II, III.B.ii. 
305. See discussion supra Section III.B.ii. 
306. See discussion supra Section III.B.ii. 
307. See discussion supra Section III.B.ii. 
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ensures that the government does not have to bear so significant of a 
financial burden as it would under a grant or subsidy approach.308 By 
permitting limited profits, the government has ensured that housing 
associations are able to protect the financial security and stability of the 
housing association through the reinvestment of profits above and 
beyond what is permitted.309 Accordingly, the guarantee, along with the 
Revolving Fund Principle, ensure that housing associations are self-
sustaining, such that government aid in the form of large grants or 
subsidies is not required.310
The Austrian methodology is more similar to American affordable 
housing policy, insofar as both rely on government subsidization, 
particularly in the construction and maintenance of housing.311 Also 
familiar is the Austrian federalist form of government and tendency 
toward decentralization.312 Under this system, federal policy and 
regulations are instituted at the provincial level, and the individual 
provinces are provided a degree of latitude in determining how to best 
utilize federal funds.313
However, there is considerable bureaucracy surrounding Austrian 
housing associations.314 In addition, Austria’s Social Partnership 
evidences a scope of cooperation between government, private, and labor 
not seen in the United States.315 Because there are already concerns that 
the administrative state in America has grown too large and too
powerful,316 it could be difficult to implement a system with the same 
degree of auditing and supervision as the Austrian system. Particularly so 
where that amount of participation is largely dependent upon 
longstanding social norms within Austria.317
308. See discussion supra Sections III.B.i, III.B.ii. 
309. OUWEHAND & VAN DAALEN, supra note 123, at 79–80; see supra Section 
III.B.ii.
310. OUWEHAND & VAN DAALEN, supra note 123, at 79–80; see supra Section 
III.B.ii.
311. See discussion supra Sections III.A.ii, III.C.ii. 
312. See discussion supra Section III.A.ii, III.A.iii. 
313. See generally HAUSMANINGER, supra note 61. 
314. See discussion supra Section III.A.ii. 
315. See discussion supra Section III.A.iii, III.C.i. 
316. See generally Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State be Tamed?,
8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 145 (2016). 
317. See discussion supra Section III.A.iii. 
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Indeed, the Dutch polder model is also characterized by the same tri-
partite cooperation as Austria’s social partnership.318 Nevertheless, the 
Dutch have embraced an approach to affordable housing that does not 
afford the government bureaucracy such a large role as in Austria.319
Indeed, most aspects of social housing in the Netherlands has been 
commercialized.320 One reason why this significant degree of 
commercialization is possible in the Netherlands is the consultation 
culture.321 The Dutch are wont to reach consensus in areas of 
policymaking, such as housing.322 While consensus rules in the 
Netherlands, compromise and accommodation seem to prevail in the 
United States.323 Whether Americans would be able to institute such a 
degree of privatization in affordable housing could hinge on Americans’
willingness to engage in meaningful debate and to create consensus.324
The Dutch and Austrian experiences both rely heavily on a corporatist 
model of management.325 As one commentator of the Dutch system 
remarked, “[w]hile it is a company with social objectives, it must 
nevertheless be just as efficiently organized and effective as any other 
commercial company in the fulfilment of its social objectives.”326 Both 
the Dutch and Austrian methods recognize that it should not be solely 
government in the business of housing.327
The bedrock of the Dutch and Austrian approaches to housing is the 
notion that cooperation between public and private interests are 
necessary to provide adequate housing. Housing is a public good, and 
318. See discussion supra Section III.B.iii. 
319. See discussion supra Section III.A.ii, III.B.ii. 
320. See discussion supra Sections III.B.i, III.B.ii. 
321. See discussion supra Section III.B.iii. 
322. See discussion supra Section III.B.iii. 
323. See e.g., Senate Legislative Process, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Senate_legislative_process.htm (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2017). 
324. Compromise is defined as “to adjust or settle by mutual concessions,” while 
consensus is defined as a “general agreement.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
(11th ed. 2014). The implication of compromise seems to be that both sides are giving 
something up to accommodate each other, while there is not necessarily such an 
exchange implicated by consensus. 
325. OUWEHAND & VAN DAALEN, supra note 123, at 36; Matznetter, supra note 81, 
at 279. 
326. OUWEHAND & VAN DAALEN, supra note 123, at 36. 
327. See discussion supra Sections III.A, III.B. 
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private companies will not be able to wholly satisfy the demand for 
housing and low-income housing, in particular. Nevertheless, the 
corporate organizational form is capable of a measure of efficiency 
surpassing that of the government’s capability. Both systems, then, 
evidence an attempt to balance the benefits and disadvantages of public 
and private participation in housing.  
In the United States’ housing industry, the distinction between public 
and private is definite. While the grant and subsidy mechanisms have 
sought to create a public-private partnership, it is a strained 
relationship.328 Developers and municipalities navigate an obstacle 
course of requirements in an attempt to make otherwise largely 
unprofitable ventures profitable for the developers.329 In the next section, 
drawing on historical social, political, and regulatory norms, this article 
proposes that the United States recalibrates the balance between public 
and private housing by introducing federal law that would allow housing 
associations to operate in the United States, while recognizing states’
individual interests and various approaches to addressing housing 
concerns. 
Proposal for Implementing Housing Associations in the US B.
This section of this article will first revisit some of the general 
concepts discussed in Section II, including the spectrum of regulation 
and the notion of balancing public and private interest in housing. 
Afterwards, a brief proposal for reform is presented, along with the 
justifications behind it. 
i. Primary Considerations
Early on in this note, the notion of a one-dimensional spectrum of 
regulation was discussed.330 While that simple analogy makes sense 
when thinking about how much regulation a country employs, the model 
is too simplistic to cover the various approaches of regulation that a
country might engage in. The one-dimensional model fails to 
328. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
329. See discussion supra Sections III.C.ii, III.C.iii. 
330. See discussion supra Section II. 
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demonstrate the nuances of different regulatory schemes. At this point, it 
might be more useful to think in terms of a three-dimensional 
framework. Each system as a whole, and each subset—a single subsidy, 
for example—of that system, of affordable housing balances a number of 
considerations, chiefly among them: (1) where to source financing in a 
spectrum ranging from pure-public to pure-private; (2) where to place 
control in a spectrum ranging from pure-public to pure-private control; 
and (3) where to place the objective in a spectrum ranging from universal 
housing to no affordable housing. It is important to note that none of the 
countries examined within this note falls into any of the “pure”
categories, although the Netherlands is regarded as having a universal 
housing allocation criteria.331 Nevertheless, this framework is useful for 
visualizing how these various mechanisms and purposes for providing 
affordable housing interact. The graph below demonstrates this three-
dimensional framework: 
331. See discussion supra Section II. 
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Determining where on the spectrum to place financing for housing 
associations could be the most puzzling question that must be answered 
before importing housing associations into the United States. Indeed, 
control is already placed largely in the hands of capable developers, 
while financing is largely undertaken by the federal and state 
governments.332 The second most difficult consideration is whether 
Americans are willing to broaden the objective of affordable housing to 
encompass something nearer to universal housing. The past century 
demonstrates powerful capitalist and self-reliant strains, though it is not 
332. See discussion supra Sections III.C.ii, III.C.iii. 
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entirely clear that will continue to be the case.333 Much of the past 
presidential election in the United States was waged over the role of 
administrative agencies within the federal government.334 The current 
administration seems poised to rein in agency power.335 However, many 
in America would expand social services, thereby granting agencies 
more power and more discretion.336
This article takes the position that somewhere closer on the spectrum 
to the Netherlands would be best received in the United States. Even for 
those who are in favor of expanding social services and promoting public 
welfare, importing housing associations would be a major departure from 
the current approach. The significant degree of bureaucracy within 
Austria may not be received well by liberals, let alone conservatives, 
both of which would likely find it overbearing and out of place in the 
United States. Moreover, conservatives may appreciate the Dutch 
approach for the amount of freedom and discretion that the housing 
333. See discussion supra Section III.C.i. 
334. See, e.g., 2016 Presidential Candidates on Government Regulations,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/2016_presidential_candidates_on_government_regulations (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2017); Gregg Badichek, Climate Change Policy and the 2016 
Presidential Election, COMMON LAW (Feb. 2, 2016), 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/commonlaw/2016/02/02/climate-change-policy-and-the-
2016-presidential-election/; Peter Shane, Donald Trump and the War Against 
Independent Agencies, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov. 25, 2016), 
http://washingtonmonthly.com/2016/11/25/donald-trump-and-the-war-against-
independent-agencies/; Lisa Rein & Juliet Eilperin, Federal Agencies Rush to Fill Job 
Openings Before Trump Takes Office Jan. 20, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/federal-agencies-rush-to-fill-job-openings-
before-trump-takes-office-jan-20/2016/12/30/de0c1030-cdd8-11e6-a747-
d03044780a02_story.html. 
335. See sources cited supra note 317. Furthermore, Supreme Court nominee Neil 
Gorsuch has stated that Chevron deference has gone too far and that it is time for 
reconsideration. Jonathan H. Adler, Should Chevron be Reconsidered A Federal Judge 
Thinks So, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/08/24/should-chevron-be-reconsidered-a-federal-judge-thinks-so/. 
336. See, e.g., Poverty to Prosperity Program and the CAP Economic Policy 
Team, Expanding Opportunities in America’s Urban Areas, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Mar. 23, 2015, 9:10 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2015/03/23/109460/expanding-
opportunities-in-americas-urban-areas/ (discussing steps the government can take to 
improve American cities, and pertinent to this discussion, placing “greater emphasis on 
leveraging private investment.”).
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associations are provided under Dutch law. Liberals may welcome a 
broader approach to affordable housing aimed at more than merely the 
poorest, although there may be some distrust of the ability of the private 
sector to effectively create affordable housing.337 The following 
paragraphs examine what specific mechanisms might be imported and 
how. 
ii. The Proposal
Austria and the United States, in their approaches to affordable 
housing, both employ a decentralized federalist system.338 At least 
superficially, there appears to be a correlation between federalism, 
subsidization, and bureaucracy, which feature predominantly in the 
context of the housing markets of the United States and Austria. 
Nevertheless, this decentralized federalist approach offers significant 
benefits—namely flexibility—and should be preserved.339 However, one 
downside of the decentralized federalist approach is that it provides the 
most benefit to states with sophisticated affordable housing markets and 
states without such sophisticated industry lag behind. If an industry 
organization, such as Aedes340 in the Netherlands or GVB341 in Austria, 
were established in the United States to provide guidance, auditing 
services, and oversight, it may help to close this gap.342 The grants and 
subsidies currently available afford states and municipalities, along with 
the input of private developers, the ability to make highly individualized 
337. See generally Abigail Savitch-Lew, What Will a Larger Private-Sector Role 
Mean for Public Housing?, CITYLIMITS (Mar. 18, 2016), 
https://citylimits.org/2016/03/18/what-will-a-larger-private-sector-role-mean-for-public-
housing/. 
338. See discussion supra Sections II, III.A, III.C. 
339. See discussion supra Section III.C.ii. 
340. See AEDES, https://www.aedes.nl/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2017). 
341. See GBV, http://www.gbv.at/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2017). 
342. States, as laboratories of democracy could experiment with different tools and 
methods for utilizing CDCs, and a national industry organization would be a useful 
means for collecting and analyzing all of the data generated by unique state approaches. 
As discussed throughout the note, because the United States relies on so many different 
programs to provide affordable housing, meaningful analysis is difficult because it 
necessarily implicates so many different variables. Aedes and GBV issue frequent reports 
on the business of housing associations that makes it easier to aggregate the data and 
quantify the services provided by housing associations. 
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determinations as to what their communities need—be it demolition and 
new construction or maintenance.343 Subsidization is not the only means 
to ensure flexibility, as the Dutch experience indicates. 
The Dutch guarantee method of financing is a novel approach to 
affordable housing and one that should be considered for application in 
the United States. The government already provides credit opportunities 
to “help college students afford tuition, first-time homebuyers access 
affordable mortgages, and budding small businesses get the capital they 
need to expand.”344 Moreover, these other endeavors place a low burden 
on taxpayers—roughly $0.94 per $100 loaned or guaranteed.345 “On 
average, every $1 allocated to loan and guarantee programs generates 
more than $99 of economic activity….”346 Financing procured by a 
guaranteed loan could be utilized in a manner that would preserve the 
same degree of flexibility as under current housing law.347
Both Austria and the Netherlands have recognized that some degree 
of subsidization is necessary to ensure that the lowest-income group is 
adequately served.348 Accordingly, the United States should continue to 
use rent subsidies for the lowest-income earners because housing 
associations are best at supplying available housing for low to middle 
classes.349 If the guaranteed loan system is efficient, then there could be 
comparatively more money available for subsidizing the lowest income 
brackets. As in the Netherlands, this could be an effective means of 
reducing the concentration of poverty and promoting mixed-income 
communities. 
343. See supra Section III.C.ii, III.C.iii. 
344. John Griffith & Richard Caperton, Major Analysis: Federal Loans and Loan 
Guarantees Have a Huge Benefit But a Low and Predictable Cost, THINKPROGRESS (May 
3, 2012, 2:26 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/major-analysis-federal-loans-and-loan-
guarantees-have-a-huge-benefit-but-a-low-and-predicatable-cost-
9f263b21d94#.tpef878ez. 
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Both the Netherlands and Austria do limit the types of business that housing 
associations can be involved in, and municipalities and provinces still play a role in 
determining where affordable housing needs must be addressed. See discussion supra
Sections III.A, III.B. 
348. See discussion supra Sections III.A.ii, III.B.ii. 
349. Id.
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Moreover, in the Netherlands, the shift to a guaranteed loan method of 
financing did not occur overnight,350 and it need not occur overnight in 
the United States. Rather, any reforms should recognize incremental 
change as its objective to promote stability and ensure continuing access 
to housing. In this sense, the most relied upon supply-side subsidies 
should be preserved, but phase-out periods should be seriously 
considered. These sunset provisions351 could ensure that housing would 
continue to be created and maintained while housing associations are 
formed and get on their feet.352 It would also discourage continued 
reliance on these subsidies so as to encourage the shift towards housing 
associations. 
In some ways, US CDCs have already begun to lay a foundation for 
importing housing associations into the United States.353 It may be 
possible, as a matter of expediency, to reform and expand CDC law 
rather than creating an entirely new entity. A specialized form of CDC, 
recognized for the express purpose of promoting affordable housing, 
could be the American equivalent of housing associations. The reforms 
discussed above—a national certification program through an industry 
organization, a national guaranteed loan system with favorable interest 
rates, increased subsidization for the lowest-income families, and a 
broader allocation criteria—would place CDCs on similar footing to 
housing associations in Austria and the Netherlands. 
Undoubtedly, there will be challenges if this reform is pursued. 
However, developers are already struggling with arguably the most 
significant of these challenges—as one developer noted, “trying to build 
350. See discussion supra Sections III.A.i, III.A.ii. 
351. “A statute under which a governmental . . . program automatically terminates 
at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed.” Sunset Law, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In this sense, current subsidies could be assigned fixed 
termination dates, and if Congress determined that the subsidies were still necessary for 
transition, it could extend the termination date into the future. 
352. See generally Erin Dewey, Sundown and You Better Take Care: Why Sunset 
Provisions Harm the Renewable Energy Industry and Violate Tax Principles, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 1105 (2011) (discussing how sunset provisions are inefficient for promoting new 
policy objectives). Conversely, for the same reason that sunset provisions are not helpful 
for promoting new policy goals, they could be useful for eliminating the old subsidies 
and grants. 
353. See discussion supra Section III.C.iii.4. 
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[a] community[] [is] the hardest part.”354 The Dutch experience, in 
particular, demonstrates the positive role that housing associations can 
play in reducing the stigma against affordable housing and low-income 
residents. Moreover, if developers are already struggling with 
community building, then importing housing associations would not 
present a new obstacle in this regard. Rather, it could present a unique 
way to address existing concerns and provide a framework by which 
these same developers can reform their operations as housing 
associations and successfully engage in community building. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND THE FUTURE OF AFFORDABLE V.
HOUSING IN THE US
Housing reform represents an elephant in the room. While the various 
approaches to affordable housing in the United States have been written 
upon and critiqued extensively, attempts at reform appear markedly 
familiar—more or new grants and subsidization. HUD programs and the 
other mechanisms for providing affordable housing could perhaps be 
best characterized as the numerous heads of a hydra—the many-headed 
serpentine beast of Greek and Roman mythology. The sheer number of 
different programs operating to promote overlapping purposes could 
explain the reluctance towards consideration of more simplified 
approaches to affordable housing. This article takes the position that the 
time is rapidly approaching at which the hydra must be slain. 
At the outset, this article recognized that unchecked gentrification and 
urban sprawl threaten the wellbeing of both the American people and 
landscape.355 Advocates of smart growth are working within various 
levels of state government to ensure that planning, zoning, and 
development are performed with an eye towards the future.356 Efficiency 
and sustainability are the keystone of that endeavor.357 Efficiency and 
sustainability should be the keystone of affordable housing reform—how 
to achieve those objectives is the question. Adopting aspects of the Dutch 
and Austrian housing association systems could be the answer. 
354. Mortice, supra note 11. 
355. See discussion supra Section I. 
356. See supra note 21 and Section I. 
357. See supra note 21 and Section I. 
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This article is a call for more data collection and for more research 
and analysis. While the current administration seems poised to dismantle, 
or at least significantly alter aspects of, the regulatory state, now could be 
the perfect time to devise a new and improved plan for the future. 
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